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CAN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
HELP US TO UNDERSTAND C.O.B.R.A.?:
A CHALLENGE TO EMPLOYMENT-BASED
HEALTH INSURANCE
ALISON MCMORRAN SULENTIC*

COBRA bedevils health plan administrators throughout the
United States on a daily basis. It seems ironic, therefore, that the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA that are
commonly known as COBRA have inspired only a modest amount
of legal scholarship.! While frequently a topic for continuing legal
education programs, COBRA remains a subject that legal scholars
seldom address unless a court hands down a particularly
compelling decision or the Internal Revenue Service promulgates a
set of regulations.2 In the fast-paced practice of employee benefits
law, judicial decisions and legislative or administrative actions
. Associate Professor, Duquesne University School of Law; J.D. Harvard
Law School (1989). I offer my thanks to the participants in the April 2006
John Marshall Law Review symposium on employee benefits for their
comments and to Jacki Mirowitz for her research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Ann Hilton Fisher, Small Employers and the Health Insurance
Needs of Employees with High Health Care Costs: A Need for Better Models, 8
EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 53 (2004); Jason R. Yungtum, COBRA &
Preexisting Coverage After The Supreme Court's Decision in Geissal v. Moore
Medical Corp., 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1541 (1999); Joey Nichols, U.S. Supreme
Court Denies Employer the Right to Exclude COBRA Benefits to Terminated
Employee Where Employee Had Other Group Health Plan in Place Prior to
COBRA Election Date, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 692 (1999); Sarah
Rudolph Cole, Continuation Coverage under COBRA: A Study in Statutory
Interpretation, 22 J. LEGIS 195 (1996); Nora Fitzgerald, Note, You're Sick?
You're Fired! The Case for EliminatingCOBRA's Gross Misconduct Exception,
80 MINN. L. REV. 197 (1995); Thomas H. Somers, COBRA: An Incremental
Approach to National Health Insurance, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY
141 (1989); Marshall W. Grate, COBRA's Requirements for Group Health
Plans:Do They Apply in a Strike?, 4 LAB. LAW. 35 (1988).
2. Roberta Casper Watson's contribution to continuing legal education
programs featuring COBRA deserves special attention for the detail and
subtlety of her attention to the many facets of COBRA analysis. See, e.g.,
Roberta Casper Watson, COBRA Health Continuation Benefits Under the
New and Old Regulations, American Law Institute - American Bar Association
Continuing Legal Education, Fundamentals of Employee Benefits Law (March
3-5, 2005); PAMELA SANDE, JOAN VIGLIOTTA AND ROBERTA CASPER WATSON,
QUICK REFERENCE TO COBRA COMPLIANCE, 2003 (Aspen Publishers, Inc.
2003).
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rightfully command scholarly attention in order to assess the
potential for institutional change and to assist practitioners in
developing and implementing a response. This article, however,
depicts COBRA not at a particular point of crisis or change, but
rather in the broader context of the health care financing system
and employment compensation arrangements.
Offering a descriptive analysis of the role of continuation
coverage within our health care financing and employment
compensation systems departs, to a certain extent, from the
traditionally normative focus of legal scholarship.! Edward Rubin
criticizes "standard legal scholarship" as insufficiently "concerned
with exploring the underlying function or significance of law."'
Rubin argues instead that legal scholarship's "distinctively
prescriptive stance" is "derived from [the scholar's] vision of reality
itself, not from some normative theory that exists apart from that
reality." Viewed in this light, prescriptive scholarship addressed
to judicial or legislative decision-makers is an exercise in
persuasion rather than an increase in understanding or
knowledge.6 Rubin suggests instead that legal scholars "begi[n]

3. For an assessment of legal scholarship, see Deborah L. Rhode, Legal
Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1328 (2002)("The legal profession has no
shared vision of what kinds of scholarship are most valuable or even most
valued by the academy.").
4. Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 Wis. L. REV.
521, 534 (1997). See also Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of
Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1847-53 (1988)(discussing legal
scholarship as legal prescriptions).
5. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, supra note 4 at 542. Rubin's
criticism is reminiscent of Emile Durkheim's observation of prescriptive
scholarship:
Thus, the actual contribution of scientific investigation to economics and
ethics is very limited, while that of art is preponderant. Ethical theory
is limited merely to a few discussions on the idea of duty, the good and
right. And even these abstract speculations do not constitute a science,
strictly speaking, since their object is the determination not of that
which is, in fact, the supreme rule of morality but of what it ought to be.
Similarly, economists are today principally occupied with the problem of
whether society ought to be organized on an individualistic or socialistic
basis, whether it is better that that state should intervene in industrial
and commercial relations, or whether it is better to abandon them to
private initiative; whether one ought to use a single monetary standard,
or a bimetallic system, etc.
See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 25-26 (ed.

George E.G. Catlin, trans. Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller, Free Press
8th ed. 1966) [hereinafter DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD].

6. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, supra note 4 at 541-42. Rubin
notes that descriptive work such as practitioner manuals and treatises is
.generally not regarded as scholarship .... The sociological fact that this work
is not regarded as true scholarship within the legal academy suggests the
centrality of prescription as a distinguishing feature of the field, since the
subject matter of the two categories is obviously indistinguishable." Id. at 523.
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from clearly articulated norms [in order to] elaborate the
implications of [these] norms."7 Such a challenge requires not only
the self-conscious attention of the scholar to his or her own
normative assumptions about a particular area of examination,
but also a commitment to producing a nuanced descriptive
assessment of the topic of the study that self-consciously addresses
those normative assumptions.
This article responds to Rubin's challenge by using some of
the tools of systems analysis in order to depict the role of COBRA
in the seemingly disparate systems of health care financing and
employment compensation. Systems analysis offers an efficient
method for providing a detailed description of the topic under
examination and exposing normative assumptions that might
otherwise color legal analysis.' In an influential article entitled
The Systems Approach to Law, Lynn LoPucki explained the
traditional application of systems analysis in computer
programming, engineering and related fields and suggested that
this method might prove helpful to "put legal scholarship in touch
with reality."9 LoPucki defined systems analysis as follows:

See also Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1314,
1320-21 (2002) (noting that most legal scholarship is directed to "the
profession at large, particularly judges and lawyers" and arguing that
interdisciplinary scholarship directed to other scholars should be assessed in
terms of its practical impact); Rhode, supra note 3, at 1337-38 ("the extent to
which high theory and interdisciplinary work have displaced traditional
doctrinal analysis is overstated.").
7. Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship,
supra note 4, at 1904-05.
Rubin has argued that the first criterion for
excellence in legal scholarship should be a principle of normative clarity or
coherence. The legal scholar can achieve understanding only by identifying
his controlling norms with clarity and by explaining their relationship to his
specific arguments. See Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for
EvaluatingLegal Scholarship,80 CAL. L. REV. 889, 915-16 (1992).
8. Rubin states that the systems theory developed by Nicholas Luhmann
"suggest[s] that legal scholarship possesses its own discourse and cannot
profitably borrow empirical insights from social science." Rubin, Law and the
Methodology of Law, supra note 4 at 558-59. Rubin criticizes the autopoiesis
theory (essentially that law is self-contained and "self-reproductive") as overreaching. He states:
Legal scholars ... can be part of an autopoietic legal system, they need
not be. Instead they can make direct use of social science to understand
the events that affect the legal system and to measure the effects of the
legal system on external phenomena. By doing so, they can frame
prescriptions that reflect a deeper understanding of the system, and
that may be particularly useful to legal actors. Legal scholars would
indeed be playing an influential and valuable role if they could
penetrate the system's dysfunctional and somewhat old-fashioned
autopoieticism.
Id. at 564.
9. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
479, 482 (1997)[hereinafter LoPucki, The Systems Approach].
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Systems analysis proceeds by identifying systems, discovering their
goals or attributing goals to them, mapping their subsystems and
the functions each performs, determining their internal structures,
depicting them with attention paid to efficiency of presentation, and
searching for internal inconsistencies.
These methods generate
analytical power by increasing the number of goals, elements, and
circumstances
that the analyst
can take into account
simultaneously.' °
Systems analysis has been put to effective use in legal
scholarship in the analysis of commercial statutes such as the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Code. 1 LoPucki
has also explored the potential for systems analysis to shed light
on proposed reforms to the process of obtaining informed consent
for cardiac procedures. 2 More recently, the systems approach has
pointed out new directions for the analysis of liability for medical
errors, 13 corporate governance rules 4 and the impact of
malfunctioning voting technology." Each of these very different

10. Id. at 481. This description reflects many of the same concerns that
Rubin identifies as significant in Continental thinking.
The Continental approach.. .emphasizes two different, although
generally interwoven, themes. First, participation in a social movement
is a dynamic process in which the individual transforms and redefines
herself in her interaction with others. Second, the movement as a whole
develops a collective identity, an emergent self-definition that functions
analogously to the way that self-definition functions for an individual.
The interplay between the socially constructed identities of the
individual and the movement is mediated by various mechanisms. One
such mechanism particularly favored by Continental scholars is the
social network of relationships among individuals, itself both a precondition for social movements and a product of these movements.
See Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature
and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (2001).
11. See Lynn M. Lopucki, Should the Secured Credit Carve Out Apply Only
in Bankruptcy? A Systems/Strategic Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1483
(1997) (applying systems approach to analyze the difference between
bankruptcy reforms proposed by Bebchuk, Fried and Warren) [hereinafter
LoPucki, Should the Secured Credit Carve Out Apply Only in Bankruptcy?].
12. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Twerski and Cohen's Second Revolution: A
Systems/Strategic Perspective, 94 NORTHwESTERN U. L. REV. 55
(1999)(discussing informed consent) [hereinafter LoPucki, Twerski and
Cohen's Second Revolution].
13. See Larry I. Palmer, Patient Safety, Risk Reduction, and the Law, 36
Hous. L. REV. 1609 (1999)(analyzing potential medical liability) [hereinafter
Palmer, PatientSafety, Risk Reduction, and the Law].
14. See Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance
Reform: Why Importing U.S. CorporateLaw Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1055 (2004) [hereinafter Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate
Governance Reform ](analyzing a market bond approach for developing
countries).
15. See Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 625 (2002) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Voting Technology and
Democracy] (using systems approach to explore the issues of election
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topics is fraught with complexity, both in terms of empirical
reality and lived experience and in terms of legal doctrine.
Systems analysis acknowledges this complexity by contextualizing
legal doctrine and accounting for the influence of non-doctrinal
factors. Anyone who has ever analyzed a claim for continuation
benefits under COBRA can testify to the complexity of a statute
that reaches into the disparate realms of taxation, employment
law, health care financing and pure human emotion in the face of
life-changing events. While the need for circumscribed analysis of
specific statutory or administrative language will undoubtedly
remain important and, indeed, necessary in order to understand
and apply COBRA, systems analysis provides an organized
method that takes into account market trends, business practices
and other factors that would not necessarily come to light in a
purely doctrinal work.
Systems analysis occasionally comes under fire for its
potential to regard existing social relationships as fixed and
imperturbable and, thus, to implicitly reinforce these patterns. 6
Despite the fine contributions of Lynn LoPucki and others,
systems analysis has not reached the mainstream of legal
scholarship.
Moreover, notwithstanding some fascinating
contributions from sociology and other disciplines, legal scholars
have not explored the possible merits of systems analysis in
sufficient numbers to enable a canonical determination of the
norms and methodology that define its boundaries. 7 It is not
necessary to dismiss these observations, however, in order to
suggest that the exploration of systems analysis and other
sociological methods will encourage and facilitate a greater
understanding of the dense and complex world in which laws are
supposed to function.
With the help of systems analysis
techniques, decision-makers will be better equipped to understand
and manage the issues before them. Such normative tasks may
include, for example, the legislator's assessment of large-scale
questions ("Should legislation such as COBRA bind together such
disparate systems as health care financing and employment?") as
well as more focused decisions of a small-business owner ("If I set
up a health plan, what am I getting myself into?").
technology and democracy).
16. See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, Gender Stereotypes at Work, 65 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 1073, 1101 n. 128 (1999).
17. For examples of sociological contributions to the study of law, see
ROGER COTTERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
(Butterworths 1984) [hereinafter COTTERELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW]; LISA
J. MCINTYRE, LAw IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE: A RECONSTRUCTION

(Westview Press 1994). Deborah Rhode notes some of the difficulties involved
in the application of social science techniques by legal scholars, including a
lack of training in social science methodology (particularly with respect to
empirical work). See Rhode, supra note 3, at 1352-53.
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This article suggests that systems analysis proves an effective
tool for examining the role of COBRA in the current system of
health care financing in the United States. Part One draws from
the emerging legal scholarship on systems analysis to provide a
brief introduction to this methodology, which may be unfamiliar to
some readers. In Part Two, I examine the uniquely awkward
structure of COBRA and the appropriate defining "system" within
which COBRA should be located. Due to the unique structuring of
American health care financing, one might regard COBRA as an
essential component of a system dedicated to providing health
care.
In this context, COBRA effectively shifts the cost of
providing such care, on a temporary basis, to the covered
individual and his insurer rather than the public purse. Yet the
entity that is primarily responsible for the administration of
COBRA is not the government or the affected individual, but the
employer. As currently structured, COBRA functions primarily
within the employment compensation system yet lacks an obvious
connection to the goals of that system. I conclude that systems
analysis increases our understanding of COBRA and its flaws and
suggests a direction for the development of proposals for future
legislative reform.
I.

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

Systems analysis responds to the need for descriptive
information of the environment in which the law functions.
LoPucki suggests that "[t]he systems approach provides a way for
legal scholars to get in touch with reality, to discover how lawrelated systems work through empiricism, and to discover how
they can be improved through modeling." 8 This methodology
challenges legal scholars "to observe how subsystems function and
how they contribute to the achievement of the system's overall
purpose." 9
In theory, therefore, the diligent use of systems
analysis should unveil not only legal doctrines, but also the
empirical reality in which those doctrines operate.
According to this method of analysis, human beings, in all
their individual and relational complexity, play an "observable
role" in a complex system that operates alongside and in tension
with legal doctrines." Unlike a purely doctrinal approach to legal

18. See LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, supra note 9, at 521-22.
19. See Lynn M. LoPucki and George C. Triantis, A Systems Approach to
Comparing U.S. and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed
Companies, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 267, 271 (1994) [hereinafter LoPucki and
Triantis, Comparing U.S. and CanadianReorganizations].
and Triantis, Comparing U.S. and Canadian
20. See LoPucki
Reogranizations,supra note 19, at 271-72 ("A systems analyst's reference to a
legal system should include the courts, the lawyers, the reorganizing
companies, documents, information flows, transaction costs, computer
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analysis, the systems approach regards the observation and
depiction of these non-doctrinal factors as legitimate and, indeed,
necessary components in any realistic description of a particular
system.2' In practice, doctrinal legal analysis examines "law ...in
its own terms" through the examination of "the rules, principles
and concepts set out in law books and authoritatively stated in
legislation or deduced from judicial decisions."2 Sociologist Roger
Cotterrell notes that the "pragmatic rationalizations of legal rules
into more or less systematic form" and the ensuing "generalisation
of doctrine" play a crucial role in the daily lives of practicing
lawyers. For Cotterell, the task of explaining the nature of law
requires "not only systematic empirical analysis of legal doctrine
and institutions, but
also of the social environment in which legal
24
institutions exist."
Systems analysis is one tool that may enable legal scholars to
widen the scope of analysis beyond the confines of a particular
judicial, legislative or administrative decision. LoPucki contends
that systems analysis prods legal scholars to extend the field of
inquiry far beyond the review of statutes, regulations and case
law. 2' According to LoPucki, the minimum requirements for
successful systems analysis include:
1. Identifying the
system
and
its
distinguishing
2
characteristics;

systems, and anything else that plays an observable role in court-supervised
reorganizations-including law and ideology.").
21. Systems analysis techniques have been used in order to facilitate
problem-solving by decision-makers in the military, in the sciences and in
management for many years. See generally R. C. Tomlinson, Operational
Research and Systems Analysis: From Practice to Precept, 287 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC'Y OF LONDON. SERIES A, MATHEMATICAL &

PHYSICAL SCI. 355-56 (1977) (noting that scholars who use systems analysis
methods "may argue as to who should have responsibility for a particular
study, but they recognize the common methodology and respect the common
problems of scientific integrity").
22. ROGER COTTERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 2
(Butterworths 1984) [hereinafter COTTERELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW].

23. See id. at 3 (British spelling from original text).
24. Id.; See also Richard A. Posnei, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous
Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARv. L. REV. 761, 762 (1987)(describing the notion
of law as "an autonomous discipline.. properly entrusted to persons train in
law and in nothing else" is a "perverse or at best incomplete way of thinking
about law").
25. See, e.g., LoPucki and Triantis, Comparing U.S. and Canadian
Reorganizations,supra note 19, at 338 (noting that the source of information
most accessible to this study was legislation and case law, which the authors
used with caution in light of their desire to consider them in context as part of
a more complicated system).
26. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, supra note 9, at 497-98.

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:753

2. Attributing goals (whether
"positive" or "normative" in
27
nature") to the system
3. Identifying subsystems in order 8to determine the
structure and function of the system;
4. Describing relationships among systems components (for
example, through developing diagrams, flow-charting or
other "external aids");'
5. Identifying inconsistencies between the goal of a system
and the methods used to achieve that goal. °
The more complex depiction of a law-related system that results
from attention to this kind of detail in turn permits the analyst to
observe when system functions "can be performed by law or by
extra-legal means.
In many ways, the application of systems analysis to lawrelated subjects draws on methodologies developed by the social
theoreticians of the late 19'- and early 20'- centuries.2 Schooled
27. Id. at 502-03. I have continued the use of the term "goals" in this
Article in keeping with LoPucki's methodology.
However, I note that
Durkheim's effort to validate sociology as a social science led him to prefer the
term "function" as less likely to imply any prejudgments concerning the
resolution of a particular problem. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF

LABOR IN SOCIETY 49 (trans. George Simpson, Free Press 1964) [HEREINAFTER
DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY].

See generally COTrERELL,

THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 22, at 74-76 (describing the difference
between "function" and "purpose" in law).
28. See LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, supra note 9, at 503-04
(discussing subsystems under the "systems theory").
29. Id. at 505-06.
30. Id. at 506. LoPucki's description of systems analysis bears the mark of
a Durkheim / Parsons heritage. According to Moshe Hirsch, Talcott Parsons
developed a "theory of action" that involved four elements: "(a) an agent (one
or more actors), (b) the goal of action, (c) the environment in which the action
is taken ('situation'), and (d) the normative environment in which the action
takes place ('normative action').
Parsons identified "four functional
imperatives of any society:" adaptation, goal attainment, integration and
latency (pattern maintenance).
See Moshe Hirsch, The Sociology of
International Law: Invitation to Study International Rules in Their Social
Context, 55 U. TORONTO L. J. 891, 899-900 (2005).
31. See LoPucki and Triantis, Comparing U.S. and Canadian
Reogranizations, supra note 19, at 272 (describing subfunctions of a
reorganization system where law is one component).
32. See generally COTFERELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 22, at 4

("The possibility of ultimately describing and analysing the social reality of
law, as the embodiment of knowledge which transcends partial perspectives, is
the possibility of science."). Significant contributors to the development of the
methodology of social sciences include Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and
Talcott Parsons.
Durkheim (described by Cotterell as exemplifying
"sociological positivism") believed that scientific methods could be applied to
the study of social phenomena by treating "social facts" as observable objects.
See generally EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD

14

(ed. George E.G. Catlin, trans. Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller, Free
Press 8th ed. 1966) [hereinafter DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL
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in the theories of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, social
scientists have long acknowledged that normative assumptions
color a person's analysis of a particular system.' Durkheim, in
particular, warned social scientists against the temptation of
substituting personal ideas about social conduct for the more
nuanced results of "observing, describing, and comparing things."34
Durkheim worried that such a mistake would not produce
objective results, and suggested instead that it would be more
profitable to regard "social facts" or "social phenomena" as "things"
or "data."" Under Durkheim's approach, "[a]ll preconceptions
must be eradicated" in order to "escape the realm of lay ideas and
to turn [one's] attention to facts."36
In the realm of legal
scholarship, Edward Rubin similarly points to the importance of
identifying and disclosing the normative assumptions that impact
the manner in which an author approaches a topic.3
This practice encourages a candid evaluation of the extent to
which the personal opinions and values of an author filter his or
her analysis of "social facts" as "things" or "data." Max Weber's
instructions to scholars and teachers in this regard are both clear
and emphatic:
[T]he teacher [must set] as his unconditional duty, in every single
case, even to the point where it involves the danger of making his
lecture less lively or attractive, to make relentlessly clear to his
audience, and especially to himself, which of his statements are
statements of logically deduced or empirically observed facts and
which are statements of practical evaluations. Once one has
acknowledged the logical disjunction between the two spheres, it
seems to me that the assumption of this attitude is an imperative
requirement of intellectual honesty; in this case it is the absolutely
minimal requirement. 38

See also Moshe Hirsch, The Sociology of International Law:
Invitation to Study International Rules in Their Social Context, 55 U.
METHOD].

L. J. 891, 898-99 (2005) (acknowledging influence of Durkheim and
Parsons on structural-functional or systems theory analysis).
TORONTO

33. COTTERELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 22, at 15.
34. DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD, supra note
14.

32,

at

35. Id. at 29.
36. Id. at 31-34.
37. See Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, supra note
4, at 1895.
38.

MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 2 (Edward

A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, Free Press 1949) [HEREINAFTER WEBER, THE
METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES]. Rubin notes that the similarity
between the distinction that he draws between "prescriptive, descriptive and
interpretive legal discourse" and Weber's work. See Rubin, The Practice and
Discourse of Legal Scholarship,supra note 4, at 1849 n.49 (discussing Weber's
division of the study of law in "moral evaluation, sociological analysis, and
legal doctrines").
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Weber demanded that "the establishment of empirical facts"
remain "unconditionally separate" from the scholar's "own
practical evaluations, i.e., his evaluation of these facts as
satisfactory or unsatisfactory."39 He likewise required the social
scientist to exercise a guarded humility with regard to his or her
own role in suggesting or shaping policy. In his view, "[t]he social
sciences, which are strictly empirical sciences are the least fitted
to presume to save the individual the difficulty of making a choice,
and they should therefore not create the impression that they can
do so."" Weber's commentary on the scholar's role reads like an
epigram: "An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should
do but rather what he can do and under certain
circumstances what he wishes to do."41
The enormous difficulty, perhaps even the impossibility, of
separating analysis from value assumptions in the study of law
has moved Roger Cotterell to argue that "[t]he safest scientific
approach would seem to involve being alert to recognize that value
judgments inform both the selection of problems for study and
their analysis [and] to make them explicit where they can be
isolated....
While respect for sociological methodology does not
vitiate a scholar's normative assumptions, a discipline such as
systems analysis can illuminate and, if necessary, counterbalance
the extent to which a normative assumption colors the analysis of
a law-related problem.'

39. See WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note
38, at 11.
40. Id. at 19. Weber was emphatic in his belief that social sciences should
not strip the individual human actor from the responsibility of making his or
her own decisions concerning social action.
To apply the results of this analysis in the making of a decision,
however, is not a task which science can undertake; it is rather the task
of the acting, willing person: he weighs and chooses from among the
values involved according to his own conscience and his personal view of
the world. Science can make him realize that all action and naturally,
according to the circumstances, inaction imply in their consequences the
espousal of certain values-and herewith-what is today so willingly
overlooked-the rejection of certain others. The act of choice itself is his
own responsibility.
Id. at 53. Weber's exploration of the role of the social scientist in contrast to
that of the legislator is similar to Durkheim's attempt to bridge the gap
between "state law" and "living law." See COTTERELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW,
supra note 17, at 81-82 (describing Durkheim's view that "law is created in the
often ignorant isolation of high-level decision-making in the state").
41. See generally WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES,
supra note 38, at 54.
42. See COTTERELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 17, at 15.
43. See generally WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES,
supra note 38, at 60. As a former employee benefits practitioner, I can see a
parallel between the lawyer's obligation to concede final decision-making
authority to a client who has been apprised of his or her legal alternatives and
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II.

APPLYING SYSTEMS ANALYSIS TO

COBRA

LoPucki's rubric for systems analysis begins with the
identification of the appropriate system. COBRA operates within
not one but two independent, interlocking systems. The first may
roughly be termed the "health care financing system."" By this
term, I mean the elaborate systems dedicated to paying for health
care services, whether payment occurs contemporaneously with
the receipt of services, as a prospective social investment in the
creation of health care facilities, or through long-term repayments
of the cost of up-front care. The second system relevant to COBRA
pertains to the terms and conditions of employment and, in
particular, to a subsystem of employment compensation.
A. ContinuationBenefits under COBRA
In April 1986 Congress passed the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"). 45Following the
model of dual responsibility for the regulation of employee benefit
plans, Congress enacted parallel provisions that amended both the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") and
the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code").'
The obligation to
provide continuation coverage originally appeared in Section 162
of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"), along with a laundry
list of other expenditures that qualified for recognition as ordinary
and necessary business expenses.47 Within two years, however,
Congress amended the Code to provide for the imposition of excise
taxes in the event that an employer failed to comply with its
COBRA obligations."8
The tax provisions governing COBRA
the social scientist's desire to contribute through the use of "science" (the
"analysis of facts") the tools which permit legislative decision-makers to choose
"social policy" (the "statement of ideals").
The central importance of human need defines my own belief that
insuring access to adequate health care is a moral imperative and a social
responsibility. In much the same way that adequate nutrition and rest are
physical necessities, access to health care affords a person the opportunity to

attend to his physical, emotional and spiritual needs. See, e.g., Alison M.
Sulentic, Now I Lay Me Down to Sleep: Work-Related Sleep Deficits and the
Theology of Leisure, __N.D. J. L., ETHIcs & PUB. POLY _(forthcoming
2006)(on file with author). This normative assumption leads me to see the
patient as the raison d'etre for the entire system, for without the patient there
is no need to render services or to pay for those services. However, the patient
participates in a vast network of disparate actors, which systems analysis can

identify and portray.
44. In a very real sense, the health care financing system functions as a
subset of the larger system of health care delivery.

45. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986).

46. See I.R.C. § 4980B and ERISA § 601 et seq.
47. See former I.R.C. § 162(k).

48. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 ("TAMRA"), Pub.
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moved to Section 4980B and became part of the elaborate excise
tax system that motivates (some say "coerces") taxpayers to
comply with the obligations of the Code.49
The watershed event in the history of modern tax legislation
occurred later in the same year when Congress passed the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 ("TRA '96")."0 In its own way, however,
COBRA demanded a re-evaluation of the health care financing
system in the United States that proved just as radical as many of
the changes enacted by TRA '86. Following the enactment of
COBRA, employers that chose to sponsor a group health plan were
now required to offer continued participation in that plan to
"qualified beneficiaries" 1 whose enrollment would otherwise
terminate as a result of a "qualifying event."2 By requiring plan
sponsors to offer continuation coverage, COBRA encouraged an
employer to maintain a significant legal and financial relationship
with people who were no longer in its employ. Even when an
employer and an employee had severed the ties of an employment
relationship, COBRA would now bind them together again
through administrative, financial and even fiduciary connections.
The legislation forged an even more novel connection between the
plan sponsor and people whose remote connection to the employer

L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 (1988). The history of the tax provisions of
COBRA is set forth at 26 CFR § 54.4980B-1, Q&A-1(a).
49. The excise tax is generally imposed upon the employer, although in the
case of a multi-employer plan, the tax falls upon the plan itself. I.R.C. §
4980B(e)(1)(A)(ii). In certain limited circumstances, an excise tax may also be
imposed on a person who in a "legally enforceable written agreement" assumes
responsibility for performing the act that ultimately leads to the
noncompliance. I.R.C. § 4980B(e)(2)(A); 26 C.F.R. § 54.4980B-2, Q&A-10(b).
50. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
51. A "qualified beneficiary" is an individual who, on the day preceding a
"qualifying event," is covered under the plan and is a covered employee, the
spouse of a covered employee or the dependent child of a covered employee.
The term may also apply to certain new family members (such as a child born
to or placed for adoption with a covered employee). IRC § 4980B; 26 C.F.R. §
54.4980B-3, Q&A-1. Covered employees may become qualified beneficiaries
under limited circumstances, generally confined to the termination of
employment or reduction in hours of work that results in a loss of coverage
and the bankruptcy of the employer. Id. at Q&A-1(d).
52. A qualifying event is one of six events that would normally result in a
loss of coverage under a group health plan. These events include (1) the death
of the covered employee; (2) the termination of the covered employee's
employment (other than for gross misconduct) or a reduction in his hours of
employment; (3) the covered employee's divorce or separation; (4) the covered
employee's entitlement to Medicare benefits; (5) the cessation of a child's
status as a dependent of a covered employee and (6) the employer's entry into
the federal bankruptcy system. I.R.C. § 4980B(f)(3); 26 C.F.R. § 54.4980B-4,
Q&A-1.
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and whose participation in a group health plan derived. from a
family member's employment."
The link between employment status and health care
insurance dates back to the social legislation of the mid-twentieth
century.M Prior to the enactment of COBRA, employers had come
to understand that "compensation" meant more than simply the
wages or salary earned in exchange for the performance of
services. 55 The terse definition of "employee benefit plan" set forth
in Section 3(3) of ERISA belies the immense creativity evident in
the many different ways in which employers compensated their
employees." In the period between the end of World War II and
the enactment of COBRA in 1986, employers implemented
increasingly creative compensation arrangements that encouraged
(and, in some cases, mandated) "compensation" to be paid not only
as wages or salary, but also in the form of pension and profitsharing plans, subsidies for group life insurance or on-site daycare
arrangements and a host of other "employee benefits."" Among
53. I.R.C. § 4980B(g)(1)(A)(including spouses and dependants of the
employee as qualified beneficiary).
54. See generally Jennifer Klein, The Politics of Economic Security:
Employee Benefits and the Privatization of New Deal Liberalism, 16 J. OF
POLVY HIST. 34, 37-46 (2004) [hereinafter Klein, The Politics of Economic
Security].
55. Almost 30 cents of every dollar that an employer spends on
compensation represents the cost of mandated or voluntary benefits. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the average cost to an employer of
providing compensation to an employee for an hour of work in September 2005
was $26.05, of which 29.8 percent was due to the cost of fringe benefits. The
BLS statistics reflected legally mandated benefits such as payments relating
to Social Security or Workers' Compensation, as well as voluntary benefits
such as life, health and disability insurance, vacations, holidays, sick leave,
and retirement savings. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer
Costs for Employee Compensation - September 2005 (December 2005),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecec.pdf. For a discussion of
executive compensation strategies, see Susan J. Stabile, Motivating
Executives: Does Performance-based Compensation Positively Affect
ManagerialPerformance, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227 (1999) (suggesting
modifications in compensation structure).
The creativity of compensation planning strategies is reflected in the
expansive and sometimes conflicting definitions of compensation present in
the Internal Revenue Code. See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 3401(a) (defining
wages for purposes of calculating federal income tax); 3121 (defining wages for
purposes of calculating FICA tax contribution); 415(c)(3) (defining
compensation for purposes of calculating compliance with limitation on
contributions and benefits under qualified plans); 414(s) (defining
compensation applicable for additional testing of qualified plans).
56. See ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) ("The term 'employee benefit
plan' or 'plan' means an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension
benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an
employee pension benefit plan.").
57. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN AND BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE

BENEFIT LAW (3d ed. Foundation Press 2000) [hereinafter LANGBEIN AND
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the many welfare benefits available to employees, access to group
health insurance stood out as a valuable opportunity for an
employee who was willing to work in exchange for the opportunity
to be assured of his or her own coverage, as well as that of his or
her dependents.'
An employer's voluntary decision to provide group health
coverage during a period of employment fits easily within the
traditional framework of compensation.59 In other words, if Joan
must perform services in order to receive a salary and group
health coverage from Big Company, an analysis of Joan's total
compensation would have to include the cost of employer
contributions to her health care coverage as well as the amount of
her salary in order to be accurate. In other words, Big Company
subsidizes Joan's health care coverage because she performs
services. This interpretation of "compensation" is conceptually
broader than a definition that is exclusively focused on wages and
salary, but it presents a more realistic vision of the relationship
between the two parties.6°

WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW].

58. Paul Fronstin and Ray Werntz of the Employee Benefit Research
Institute found that while employers historically perceived health benefits to
be an important factor in recruiting and retaining employees, increasing
frustration with the cost of providing benefits may impact 'the willingness and
ability of employers" to continue to provide these plans. Fronstin and Werntz
suggest that employers should examine the health benefits associated with
providing insurance coverage and the impact of "worker resilience,
commitment, and ability to innovate." See Paul Fronstin and Ray Werntz, The
'Business Case' For Investing in Employee Health: A Review of the Literature
and Employer Self-Assessments, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF NO. 267 at 24 (March
2004), available at www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0304ib.pdf (last visited March 7,
2006). Additional factors that could increase an employer's valuation of health
care benefits include improvements in absenteeism and on-the-job
productivity. See Sean Nicholsonet al., How to Present the Business Case for
Healthcare Quality to Employers 4, 7(November 2005)("[A] typical U.S.
company estimates how a health-benefit or health-care quality-enhancing
program will affect their bottom line by considering only the direct medical
costs that they reimburse as health benefits."). Within the population of
employed persons, there are variations in the rate of participation in health
care plans that correlate to the size of the employer and the status of the
employee as full- or part-time. A recent study states that "85 percent of fulltime workers have access to medical care benefits, compared with only 22
percent of part-time workers," while "66 percent of full-time workers
participate in employer-provided medical care plans, compared with only 12
percent of part-time workers."
See Paul A. Welcher, Access to and
Participationin Employer-ProvidedHealth Care Plans, PrivateIndustry, 2005,
COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS ONLINE (January 25, 2006),
www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/print/cm20060120ch01.htm.
59. See Welcher, supra note 60 (elaborating on why the health benefits fit
within the traditional framework of compensation).
60. Viewed as the total payment for services rendered by an employee, this
notion of "compensation" also easily expands to include "deferred
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COBRA introduced a new role for employers. Not only would
employers participate in the traditional exchange of services for
compensation, but they were now to become administrators of a
government mandate to provide health care opportunities to
people who would otherwise be uninsured. This was a novel role
for a former employer to play. Consider, for example, that before
COBRA was enacted, there was no basis in federal law for
requiring an employer to provide health care financing to people
whom it no longer employed. Still less evident was a federal
statutory basis for requiring an employer to extend continuation
coverage to an employee's former spouse or adult child who never
actually worked as an employee in his or her own right. Absent
judicial intervention or a voluntarily assumed contractual
obligation, there was no reason for either party to expect that
health care benefits would continue once the employment
relationship (or the relationship with the employee) had
terminated.
After twenty years, we may have become hardened in the
assumption that the duty to provide continuation coverage to
terminated employees and other qualified beneficiaries is the
logical extension of the employer's contractual and, indeed, ethical
obligations.6' Yet the obligation to provide continuation benefits is
a statutory obligation imposed by Congress, rather than an
obligation that derives from an employment relationship. The
establishment of a group health plan was and continues to be a
voluntary decision by an employer in the context of a larger
compensation scheme for his business."
In contrast, COBRA
requires, rather than enables, an employer to continue to facilitate
the participation of any employee or qualified beneficiary who
elects continuation coverage after a qualifying event.
Even the financial arrangements for continuation coverage
bear little resemblance to remuneration for services rendered.
compensation." Both the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA provide a
framework for the employer's voluntary establishment of "deferred
compensation" arrangements that would permit Joan to receive some of her
compensation well after she ceases to perform active service for the
corporation. See I.R.C. § 401(b); ERISA § 3(2); see also 29 U.S.C. §
1002(2)(A)(ii).
61. See Fronstin & Werntz, supra note 60, at 4. (noting that "[diespite the
voluntary nature of employment-based health benefits, America's health care
system 'assumes' employers will provide these benefits)".
62. See Curtiss-Wright v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995)(stating
ERISA does not entitle one to employer-provided health benefits); Catherine
L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the
Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 153
(1995)(ERISA jurisprudence reflects the ideological operation of voluntarism
(the idea that Congress did not mandate employee benefits but left employers
free to volunteer benefits) within the constraints of 'bounded obligations and
federal common law."')
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COBRA does not technically require employers to bear the expense
of the continuation coverage; an employer may charge a qualified
beneficiary up to 102 percent of the premium required for coverage
under the plan.' Moreover, although some employers do absorb
the cost of COBRA coverage to the extent that this amount exceeds
premium
payments,
the
employer's
role
is
primarily
administrative rather than financial in nature. The financial
arrangements for funding the cost of COBRA coverage do not even
attempt to mimic the structures for present or deferred
compensation.
The qualified beneficiary (whether a former
employee or not) bears the cost of premiums and cannot lessen this
cost by offering to provide services without risking the loss of his
or her status as a qualified beneficiary.
This anomaly raises a host of questions.
Once the
relationship that gives rise to COBRA rights is severed, can the
employer really be said to be providing compensation in exchange
for services? And if the employer continues to provide health care
benefits, an old question re-emerges. Why? What is the logic
behind the strange mandate that employers assume an
administrative responsibility for the provision of health care
coverage to people who, by definition, have severed ties with the
employer? Why should COBRA be an obligation of employers if
the COBRA beneficiaries are paying for the cost of coverage out of
their own pockets? Systems analysis brings to light some of the
social and economic costs of conflating the system of health care
financing with the system of employment and compensation.

63. I.R.C. § 4980B(f)(2)(c)(i); Treas. Reg. § 54.4980B-8, Q&A-l(a)(1999).
Section 4980B(f)(4)(A) defines "applicable premium" as "the cost to the plan for
such period of the coverage for similarly situated beneficiaries with respect to
whom a qualifying event has not occurred without regard to whether such cost
is paid by the employer or the employee)." The Code does not specify the
methodology to be used in calculating the applicable premium and the
Treasury Regulations do not fill this gap. Treas. Reg. § 54.4980B-8, Q&A-2.
Self-insured plans must determine a "reasonable estimate of the cost of
providing coverage" to similarly situated active employees.
I.R.C. §
4980B(f)(4)(B)(i). A plan is permitted to charge a larger premium for coverage
provided only as the result of a disability extension. Treas. Reg. § 54.4980B-8,
Q&A-I(b); See also See Paul Fronstin, Ph.D., Statement, Testimony at
Hearing on Oversight of Tax Law Related to Health Insurance, Before U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means 3 (April 23,
1998).(stating that the amount of the applicable premium is not always
equivalent to the actual cost of providing health care under a plan). In
particular, qualified beneficiaries who anticipate a more urgent need for
health coverage may be more likely to elect continuation coverage under
COBRA. Because of the impact of adverse selection, the cost of premiums may
not actually reflect the cost of coverage for such individuals. Id.

2006]

A Challenge to Employment-Based Health Insurance

B. COBRA and the Health Care FinancingSystem
1.

Who participatesin the health care financing system?

Figure 1 depicts the health care financing system in terms of
the relationships that might be typical of a person who
participates in an employment-related group health insurance
plan.'
The central focus of this diagram is the individual
consumer of health care services. In the absence of a patient to
whom services are or might be rendered, there is no need for
health care and the health care financing system lacks meaning.
Figure 1 also depicts the close ties that the patient has to payors
and providers. As a patient, the consumer comes into direct
contact with the following parties:
" Providers of health care services, including physicians
and other providers of direct care services (e.g., nurses,
physician assistants, nontraditional providers);
" Health care facilities (e.g., hospitals, ambulatory surgical
centers, outpatient treatment facilities);
" Third-party payors, including insurance companies,
health maintenance organizations, employers and
government programs.
Each of these entities has a direct relationship with the
patient. In a "fee-for-service" system, there is no particular reason
why the third-party payor would be in relationship with
physicians or health care facilities. As managed care strategies
have encouraged the integration of health care delivery with
health care financing, however, the existence of contractual
relationships between the third-party payor and the professionals
and facilities that provide direct services has become increasingly
common. Figure 1 therefore indicates the relationships between
these parties, which exist independently of any particular patient.
Surrounding these core players is a broad range of economic
actors whose impact on the pricing of health care services and the
environment in which services are delivered is significant, albeit
more remote from the patient. Roughly speaking, one can include
in this larger group entities such as:
Suppliers of utilities and other necessary goods and
services, including, in particular, manufacturers and
distributors of medical equipment, durable goods and
pharmaceuticals;

64. One of the tasks of systems analysis is to search for an image or
descriptive representation that conveys the complexity of the system under
examination. While diagrams are not the only method for facilitating
description, I have created four diagrams that illustrate some of the
complexities of the COBRA problem.
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Financial backers of the institutions involved in the
direct provision of services, including guarantors of taxexempt bond financing schemes for the construction of
health care facilities;
" The Internal Revenue Service and other state and local
entities that grant favorable tax treatment to health care
facilities; and
" Public and private accrediting agencies and state
licensing agencies that set the minimum standards for
entry and continued functioning in the market.
"

The influence of these external entities may be regulatory (as in
setting the requirements necessary for qualification for tax-exempt
status), financial (such as setting the purchase price for products
or services that the hospital must purchase) or mimetic (creating
cultural or environmental factors that will cause other parties to
mimic external behaviors and strategies).6
Each component of the diagram represents a subsystem that
merits further study in its own right. For purposes of this article,
however, the subsystem of greatest concern is represented by the
third-party payor block. In the United States, the task of
financing health care falls upon many different payors who
operate independently, cooperatively, or in tension with each
other, depending upon the circumstances of a particular patient.
In 2004, over 174 million Americans or 59.8 percent of the
population
participated
in employment-based
insurance
arrangements.' An additional 79.1 million people received health
insurance through public programs, including Medicare, Medicaid
and Tricare/CHAMPVA. 7 A more detailed examination of the
non-elderly population (defined as those under age 65) reveals that
17.4 million people purchase individual insurance contracts in
order to pay for health care needs.' The number of uninsured
Americans rose to 45.8 million, a figure that represents a marginal
increase over 2003 levels, but a significant twenty-five percent
increase over the 36.8 percent who were uninsured in 1994.69 On
65. For a review of the literature on isomorphic behavior in organizations,
see Linda Yankoski, C.S.F.N., The Soul of the Matter: The Impact of
Government Funding on the Catholic Identity and Mission of Holy Family

Institute, 1900 - 2002 63-74 (Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Duquesne
University, 2003).
66. See Paul Fronstin, Uninsured Unchanged in 2004, But EmploymentBased Health Coverage Declined, 26 EBRI NOTES 2 (October 2005) [hereinafter

Fronstin, Uninsured Unchanged in 20041. Fronstin's figures are derived from
the Employee Benefit Research Institute's estimates of the March 2005
Current Population Survey and the actual figures from previous surveys.
67. Id. at 2.
68. See id. at 3-4 (explicating data in Table 3 - Nonelderly Population with
Selected Sources of Health Insurance, by Own Work Status and Work Status
of Family Head, 2004).
69. See id. at 2.
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the one hand, these figures suggest that employers (either through
self-insurance or through the purchase of contracts from insurance
companies) play a dominant role in managing the payment of
health care expenses, with significant additional contributions by
government agencies. On the other hand, the same statistics
suggest that a health care financing strategy that relies heavily on
voluntary employment-based health insurance has failed to
support the health needs of an increasingly numerous group of
uninsured or underinsured individuals.
Employment (either of the individual or a member of his or
her family) is the largest single determinant of the likelihood that
a person will be insured against health care expenditures. Despite
a modest increase in the number of people covered by government
health care programs, the majority of non-elderly Americans
receive health insurance through an employment-based group
health plan."° Moreover, the probability of enrollment in an
employment-based plan correlates positively to the size of the
employer and the amount of the family's household income."
Health economists anticipate that "a relatively weak labor market,
combined with rising health benefit costs" explains the gradual
drop in the percentage of Americans who participate in
employment-based health insurance and, if unchecked, will
continue to result in an "erosion in employment-based health
benefits.""
Requiring employers to offer continuation coverage after a
qualifying event temporarily slows down the possibility that the
qualified beneficiary will ultimately become uninsured. Unless
other assets are available, the cost of caring for the uninsured may
fall on a variety of parties, including the uninsured patient,
hospitals that perform increasing amounts of uncompensated
emergency room care and government-based providers. 3 Figure 2
illustrates the lack of connection and accountability between the
front-line parties that service insured patients and the uninsured
patient whose relationship with a third-party payor is now
defunct. By prolonging the period when an employment-based
group health plan bears the cost of care for a person who would
otherwise become uninsured, COBRA staves off the moment when

70. Id. at 3.
71. See id. at 7.
72. See id. at 7.
73. Institute of Medicine, Fact Sheet 4: Uninsurance Facts and Figures,
Uninsurance Costs the Country More Than You Think (January 2004).
Expenditures on health care for the uninsured reached $99 billion in 2003.

This amount included out-of-pocket contributions of $26.4 billion.

Id.

Examples of other assets include private wealth, amounts set aside in health
care savings accounts or gift income. See generally I.R.C. § 223 (health
savings account).
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a participant's insurance status ceases to resemble the diagram in
Figure 1 and instead becomes similar to that of Figure 2. But it
accomplishes this goal by shifting a burden that might otherwise
become a public expense to the plan sponsor of the employmentbased group health plan.
If the goal of our health care financing system is to produce
widespread access to quality health care, then it is fair to say that
COBRA insures a modest contribution to this goal by the sponsors
of employment-based group health plans. COBRA enables people
to retain group health coverage in a variety of circumstances
ranging from divorce to the termination of employment for reasons
other than gross misconduct. By electing to continue coverage
under COBRA, qualified beneficiaries theoretically avoid periods
of uninsurance that would otherwise occur as a result of changes
in employment or family lifestyle.
But the decision to posit the systemic goal of improved access
to health care likewise permits a reevaluation of some of the
aspects of COBRA that do not contribute to this end. A prime
example is the plan sponsor's ability to deny continuation coverage
under COBRA to persons whose loss of coverage occurs because of
the termination of an employee for reasons of gross misconduct. 4
By relieving the employer of the burden of continuing to provide
health benefits to such a person, COBRA undoubtedly relieves a
basic human desire to punish or, at a minimum, to ostracize a
person who has done harm to co-workers or to the employer as an
entity in its own right. Yet while a person who is terminated for
gross misconduct may have merited his employer's displeasure, his
or her need for health insurance is just as great as that of a person
whose termination is voluntary. The gross misconduct exception
points to the discontinuity between the systemic goal of increasing
access to health care financing and the application of a statutory
provision that uses a criterion unrelated to health care (here, gross
misconduct) to legitimize excluding a person from the system. The
lack of continuity between the posited goal and the actual results
of the health care financing system seems even greater in light of
COBRA's failure to define "gross misconduct."7" This provision
manifestly increases the likelihood that the affected persons will
become uninsured and it does so at a time when the terminated
employee re-enters the job market with a tainted record.

74. I.R.C. § 4980B(f)(3)(B); Treas. Reg. 54.4980B-4, Q&A-1(b)(2).
75. See, e.g., Conery v. Bath Associates, 803 F.Supp. 1388 (N.D. Ind.
1992).Because of the lack of a precise definition of gross misconduct, some
courts have exhibited a reluctance to construe "gross misconduct" in a manner
that adversely impacts the terminating employee.
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C. COBRA and the Employment Compensation System
While the phrase "health care financing system" is not
uncommon in legal scholarship, the term "employment
compensation system" is rarely employed to suggest anything
more generalized than the compensation arrangements of a
particular employer. 6 Yet, in truth, the manner in which an
employer compensates employees reflects a high degree of
regulation
and
the
influence
of market
competition.
Encapsulating the concept of an "employment compensation
system" within the context of a single employer's business plan
permits a detailed examination of whether that employer is
meeting its goals. This same narrow focus, however, diverts
attention from the analysis of the rationale and efficacy of the
manner in which employment compensation practices function on
a national scale. Since Congress has enacted many laws that
directly affect the amount, the form and the enforcement of
compensation promises, a broader perspective that considers
national regulations offers the potential to glean insights into
whether certain practices are peculiar to a particular employer or
of greater significance in the marketplace. Likewise, the influence
of
market
expectations
transcends
the
conceptual
compartmentalization of a "compensation system" and suggests
that internal compensation trends are responsive to external
market influences.
A broad-based definition of "employment compensation
system" must take into account stakeholders in addition to the
employer and the employee. At a minimum, the employment
compensation system (depicted in Figure 3) also comprises
shareholders, federal agencies (such as the Department of Labor
and the Internal Revenue Service), state agencies, unions, third76. A search for the term "employment compensation system" within the
JLR database on Westlaw produced only four hits, only one of which used the
term in a generalized sense. See Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers,
ProductLiability in the European Community: Implications for United States
Business, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 245, 254 (1993) (stating that in the European
Union, "national health plans provide free medical care, and employment
compensation systems protect against lost earnings"). A search for the term
"employee compensation system" produced a list of 14 publications, the
majority of which used the term to refer to the compensation arrangement of a
particular employer, whether private or public. An excellent student comment
that examines the tensions evident in the treatment of compensation under
the bankruptcy code is an exception to this general observation. See Allison K.
Verderber Herriott, Comment, Toward an Understanding of the Dialectical
Tensions Inherent in CEO and Key Employee Retention Plans during
Bankruptcy, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 579, 581, 613-21 (2004) (defining
"compensation system" as the impact of stakeholders, media and legislatures
on the ability to compensate key employees during bankruptcy). Searches of
the same terms in ArticleFirst, a database covering scholarly articles from a
broad range of disciplines, produced similarly unpromising results.
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party administrators of payroll systems, consultants and lawyers
who advise employers concerning potential compensation
arrangements, competing employers and advocacy groups
dedicated to the promotion of or detraction from normative policies
emphasizing a "living wage" or "fair trade" practices. In addition,
many industries also respond to the concerns of accrediting
agencies that benchmark the quality of a service or product in
relation to factors that include measurements of employee
compensation.
The conscious consideration of these factors
expands the understanding of employment compensation as a
highly regulated and market-sensitive phenomenon that reflects
certain systemic features that exist independent of the perceived
needs of particular employers and employees.
Discerning the goal of an "employment compensation system"
presents difficulties, as the different participants within that
system may well have individual goals that may be in conflict with
one another. At a very basic level, however, the goal of the
employment compensation system is to insure fairness in setting,
observing and reevaluating arrangements for the payment of
employee services. By positing this idea, I do not mean to suggest
that "fairness" invariably requires compensation amounts to tilt in
the employee's favor. Instead, I assume, for purposes of this
Article, that fairness requires the enforcement of promises on both
sides of the bargain and that this broader goal explains much of
the concern of federal, state and local legislators as well as the
influence of competitive market trends.
Within the broader concept of an "employment compensation
system," however, there is room to consider industry-based
subsystems and, within these, a second layer of subsystems
focused on individual employers. It seems plausible that both of
these subsets would share in the generalized concern for a fair
exchange and enforcement of promises made with regard to
compensation arrangements.
At a micro-level, however, a
company may redefine the goal its internal compensation system
in light of the perceived needs of its corporate mission, whether
these be directed to maximizing shareholder values, creating a
worker-friendly environment that promotes meaningful work or
other objectives. For example, compensation arrangements are
frequently responsive to the value that an employer places on
retaining long-term employees; employers that do not perceive an
economic or moral reason to encourage long-term employment as a
goal may adopt a compensation strategy that shifts away from
defined benefit plans and towards defined contribution plans. 7

77. See generally Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined
Contribution Plans, 4 FL. TAX REV. 607, 682-83 (2000); Susan J. Stabile,
PaternalismIsn't Always a Dirty Word: Can the Law Better Protect Defined

20061

A Challenge to Employment-Based Health Insurance

775

Even within an employer-specific subsystem, there is a
great deal of complexity in creating and sustaining a compensation
system.
In the simplest terms, one might observe that an
employee performs services for an employer in exchange for
payment. A more accurate description of the relationship between
employer and employee, however, would demonstrate that an
employee performs services in exchange for wages or salary and a
host of fringe benefits. In fact, the National Compensation Survey
performed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics suggests that
mandatory and voluntary benefits together account for almost 30
percent of the amount that an employer spends as compensation
for an hour's work."8 Moreover, employment permits the employee
to rely on the employer's services as a conduit between the
employee and the taxing authorities."9 In addition, an employee
may regard other intangible or unquantifiable benefits as part of
the consideration for his or her services. Among these additional
benefits of employment may be the psychological and emotional
benefits that derive from flexible scheduling, enhanced status
within the community or other conditions that provide personal
satisfaction to the employee."0
Since. American employers are not required to establish or
maintain employee benefit plans, it is necessary to search outside
the command-and-control model of government mandates to
explain the proliferation of work-related employee benefit plans.
The most common economic explanation for the popularity of
employer-provided health insurance is the "worker demand"
theory, which suggests that employers establish health insurance
plans because "workers prefer to obtain coverage through their
employers and so accept a wage offset to cover the cost of that
coverage." 8 Ellen O'Brien notes that the empirical evidence for
this theory "remains surprisingly weak" and reflects a flawed
assumption that the employee is the only party who benefits from
the establishment of the plan.82 O'Brien suggests that employers
also benefit from providing health insurance because a robust

Contribution Plan Participants,5 EMPL. RTS. & EMPL. POLY J. 491, 493-98
(2001).
78. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Costs for Employee Compensation
- September 2005, supra note 57; Bureau of Labor Statistics, National
Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in Private Industry in the United
States, March 2005 (August 2005).
79. I refer here to the employer's role in transmitting Medicare
contributions and federal, state and local income taxes.
80. See generally Ellen O'Brien, Employers' Benefits from Workers' Health
Insurance, 81 THE MILBANK Q. 1, 5 (2003) [hereinafter O'Brien, Employers'
Benefits from Workers' Health Insurance].
81. See O'Brien, supra note 82, at 1. This viewpoint is associated with
health economists Mark Pauly and Thomas Buchmuweller.
82. Id.
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compensation package permits them "to recruit and retain highquality workers" and to reap the productivity benefits of an
employee's improved physical and psychological health.' O'Brien
regards an employer's decision to provide health insurance as an
investment in "human capital" analogous to earlier efforts to
promote public education and skills-training.' Figure 3 illustrates
the complexity of the modern fringe benefit structure which is due,
in part, to this investment in human capital.
Several factors that are external to the relationship between
employer and employee also contribute to the popularity of
employer-provided health insurance. First, basic insurance theory
favors the establishment of broad risk pools as a counterbalance to
individual risk.' In a balanced group, large health expenditures of
participants who are ill or who otherwise require medical
attention can be offset by the more modest costs of providing basic
services to healthy individuals. 6 By purchasing health insurance
as part of a group, workers effectively present themselves as a
team; if one person becomes ill, the rest of the group bears the
financial burden regardless of their own good health.87 The perperson cost of health insurance is therefore likely to be lower for
groups than for individuals who purchase contracts on their own.'
In addition, a purchasing group (here, the individuals covered
under the employment-related plan) may reduce additional
administrative costs by eliminating the need for individuals to
negotiate directly with insurance companies or to invest time and
effort in evaluating different insurance options. 9

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. ROBERT E. KEETON AND ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW : A GUIDE TO
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES
(West 1988).

86. See id.
The effectiveness of group rating as a method of costcontainment increases as the size of the group expands. This phenomenon
suggests an explanation for the lower rate of health care plan sponsorship
among smaller employees. See generally Sara R. Collins, Karin Davis & Alice
Ho, A Shared Responsibility: U.S. Employers and the Provision of Health
Insurance to Employees, INQUIRY - EXCELLUS HEALTH PLAN 6, 7 (Spring

2005),

available

http://www.cmwf.orglusrdocShared-responsibilityInquiry_

at

InquirySpring_2005.pdf (describing employee groups as natural risk pools).
87. Congressional Budget Office, Background Paper: The Price Sensitivity
of Demand for Nongroup Health Insurance, 10 (August 2005), available at

http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/66xx/doc6620/08-24-HealthInsurance.pdf.
88. See Roland D. McDevitt, Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Federal Policy
Options to Support a System of Employment-Based Health Insurance (April
12, 2004), availableat www.watsonwyatt.com.

89. Id. at 2-3.
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A second explanation for the initial implementation of health
insurance plans has historical roots in the wage-and-price freezes
enacted during and after World War II.'
Unable to reward
employees through the traditional motivational strategies such as
increased salaries or hourly wages, employers turned to more
creative methods of compensation. 9 Although the wage-and-price
controls ultimately ended, the "habit" of providing and receiving
health insurance remained, presumably engrained into a favorable
ideal of compensation.
Third, while Congress has continually declined to mandate
that employers provide health insurance to employees, the federal
government has nonetheless enacted numerous tax incentives to
encourage employers to do so. Although favorable tax treatment
may not have been the point of origin of the employment-based
health insurance system, employers and employees have been able
to rely upon advantageous tax treatment of employment-based
health insurance for many years.
While these factors may explain the institutionalization of
employment-based health insurance in the American economy,
they do not, however, explain the desirability of continuing an
obligation to provide health insurance once employment has
terminated or another qualifying event has occurred.
By
definition the continuation of health benefits under COBRA begins
only because the employment link between the qualified
beneficiary and the plan sponsor has broken. The COBRA
beneficiary no longer participates in the plan as compensation for
his own services or those of a family member. Moreover, a COBRA
beneficiary who pays the premium but does not actually require
medical attention during his period of coverage is essentially a
paying customer who seeks the employer's services as a plan
administrator. This new relationship does not respond to the
goals I have posited with respect to the employment compensation
system.
Providing post-termination health care coverage in exchange
for 102 percent of the normally applicable premium has little
impact on the goal encouraging and enforcing fairness in the
bargain for wages in exchange for services. Since employers do not
normally pre-fund an employee's COBRA commitments in a
manner similar to the funding of defined benefit plans, COBRA
bears little resemblance to deferred compensation.
In fact,
COBRA is essentially a pay-as-you-go system that endures only for
the period that is both permitted by statute and endorsed by the
90. See LANGBEIN AND WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW,

supra note 59, at 15; Klein, The Politics of Economic Security, supra note 56 at
34.
91. See LANGBEIN AND WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW,

supra note 59, at 15.
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payment of premiums by the qualified beneficiary. Once the
qualifying event has taken place (whether termination of
employment or loss of coverage due to divorce or a change in
family status), the employer's participation in COBRA does not
affect whether current employees are in a better position to rely on
employer promises with regard to current wages. Moreover, other
than a moral satisfaction in facilitating the transition of former
employees who are laid off or terminated, the continuation of
health care coverage under COBRA has little to offer at-will
employers in terms of attaining particular financial goals or
productivity goals.
Figure 4 illustrates the breakdown in
relationships that results from an employee's termination.
The Supreme Court's decision in Geissal v. Moore Medical
Corp. presents further evidence for the proposition that the
primary concern of COBRA is not fairness in compensation but
rather reducing a beneficiary's likelihood of becoming uninsured.'
Geissal addresses the common practice of dual coverage; in such a
situation, a person who is eligible for coverage under the plan
maintained by his or her own employer may also be enrolled as a
dependent in his or her spouse's employment-based health plan.
In Geissal, an employee who terminated employment elected
continuation coverage and for six months participated as a
COBRA beneficiary in his employer's group health plan.93 After
six months, the employer informed the plaintiff that he was in fact
ineligible for continuation coverage because he had been covered
under his wife's group health plan from the date of his
termination.94 Based on the statutory language, which refers to
the termination of COBRA status for a participant who becomes
eligible for additional coverage after the initial date of eligibility,
the Supreme Court concluded that Mr. Geissal had always been
covered under his wife's plan and therefore could not be said to
have become eligible for this coverage after the occurrence of his
own qualifying event.95 The Court held that an employer could not
deny continuation coverage to a qualified beneficiary who is
covered under another group health plan at the time he or she
elects continuation benefits.'
What Geissal left unsaid, however, was that, in the absence of
a significant difference in the scope of coverage, Mr. Geissal's
employer would have been perfectly within its rights to terminate
his coverage if he had become covered under his wife's plan at any
time after his election of coverage.
Viewed as part of the
92. See Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp., 524 U.S. 74 (1998)(reinforcing
COBRA's goal of providing continuous coverage).
93. Id. at 76.
94. Id. at 76-77.

95. Id. at 81.
96. Id. at 87.
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employment compensation system, this result would suggest that
the distinguishing factor - here, the date of the election to
participate in his wife's plan - should be evaluated in light of its
ability to contribute to the function or goal of the system. But is it
fair to treat former employees differently depending upon the date
on which they elect coverage under a different plan? If COBRA is
part of the employment compensation system, there would seem to
be no reasonable basis for differentiating between former
employees based on this factor which, it must be noted, has
nothing to do with the terms and conditions of employment that
formerly existed between the COBRA beneficiary and the plan
sponsor. A more plausible explanation of this decision is that
COBRA functions in this regard as part of the health care
financing system, and furthers the goal of lessening uninsurance
and increasing access to health care.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of systems analysis is to set forth a description of
a problem that will facilitate decision-makers in evaluating
proposed solutions. Looking at the text of COBRA and its related
regulations can be a maddening exercise without the added
complication of considering the larger concerns of health care
financing or employment compensation.
A narrow textual
examination of COBRA limits the decision-maker to assuming
that the law is internally coherent and that the options available
to the decision-maker are defined by its boundaries.
Systems analysis, however, exposes the complexity of the
system and, in that exposition, brings some of the internal
inconsistencies of the statute to light. What is the goal of COBRA?
According to Congress, the goal is to prevent people from enduring
periods in which they are uninsured. Many people, myself
included, think this is a laudable goal. I would go further and say
that it is our social responsibility. But a problem in the health
care financing system is not necessarily resolved by creating
additional administrative responsibilities in the employment
compensation system. Moreover, the fact that COBRA functions
as part of the employment compensation system explains certain
inconsistencies in its operation that detract from the achievement
of the health care financing system's goal of increasing health
coverage.
More recent developments such as health savings
accounts encourage individual efforts to save for medical
expenditures, while the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 discourages employers from restricting
the access of newly hired employees to particular kinds of

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:753

benefits. Despite these advances, far too many Americans remain
uninsured, a fact that is an indictment of the existing health care
financing system and private and public attempts to correct the
problems of inadequate coverage.
Systems analysis can help a decision-maker to determine
what is broken and what must be fixed. In the case of COBRA, it
is the health care financing system that is broken. It seems at
best inefficient to assume that the best way to fix this problem is
to impose new responsibilities upon the employment compensation
system. In plain terms, if we want to facilitate adequate financing
for health care and limit the number of people who are burdened
by uninsurance, then we must look for the solution within the
health care financing system. The legislative decision-making
process, which has demonstrably failed to reducing rising
uninsurance, would do well to examine the disfunctionality that
systems analysis reveals.

97. For a discussion of health savings accounts and medical savings
accounts, see COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
LAw: POLICY AND PRACTICE 301-02 (2004). For a discussion of HIPAA, see

Colleen E. Medill, HIPAA and Its Related Legislation: A New Role for ERISA
in the Regulation of Private Health Care Plans?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 485, 496-97
(1998).
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FIGURE 1

Health care financing system patient covered under employmentrelated benefit plan

Public and private accrediting
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to health care facilities and
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FIGURE 2
Health care financing system
Patient terminated from eligibility for employment-related benefit
plan, declines COBRA and ineligible for Medicare or Medicaid

Public and private accrediting
agencies, including state licensing
authorities, Medicare, JCAHO

The Internal Revenue Service and
other state and local entities that
grant favorable tax treatment to
health care facilities and health care
plan sponsors

Patient
may have
HSA, or
other
resources
to pay
medical
expenses
out of
pocket
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FIGURE 3

Employee Compensation System
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